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Introduction
John Davis, Alain Marciano and Jochen Runde

The closing decades of the twentieth century saw a dramatic increase in
interest in the role of philosophical ideas in economics. The period also saw a
significant expansion in scholarly investigation into the different connections
between economics and philosophy, as seen in the emergence of new journals,
professional associations, conferences, seminar series, websites, research
networks, teaching methods, and interdisciplinary collaboration. One of the
results of this set of developments has been a remarkable distillation in thinking
about philosophy and economics around a number of key subjects and themes.
The goal of this Companion to Economics and Philosophy is to exhibit and
explore a number of these areas of convergence. The volume is accordingly
divided into three parts, each of which highlights a leading area of scholarly
concern. They are: political economy conceived as political philosophy, the
methodology and epistemology of economics, and social ontology and the
ontology of economics. The authors of the chapters in the volume were chosen
on the basis of their having made distinctive and innovative contributions to
their respective areas of expertise. In addition, authors were asked to not only
survey the state of the field as they saw it, but also provide statements of their
own positions and their perspectives on the field in question and its possible
direction of development in the future. We thus hope this volume will serve not
only as an introduction to the field, but also stimulate further work and thinking
concerning the questions it investigates.
Political economy conceived as political philosophy
The essays in the first part of this Companion investigate the idea of economics
or political economy as political philosophy. This last term should not to be
understood in the pejoratively restrictive sense of Rosenberg’s (1992) definition
of economics as mathematical political science. Rather, it should be taken to
refer to the use of specific (namely economic) tools to understand the conditions
of social order. This perspective harks back to the founders of economics and
their conception of the discipline. Of course some would argue that more than
two hundred years of scientific research have carried the discipline away from
this conception. In fact, however, and as the issues discussed in the chapters
in this section show, the distance that separates political economy in its recent
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Regarding political economy as a form of political philosophy is not to
deny its existence as a self-standing scientific discipline. Political economy
is indeed a separate science in its own right and, in the opening chapter on
‘Natural Law, Natural History and the Foundations of Political Economy’,
José Luìs Cardoso shows how it came to be so. Cardoso’s argument proceeds
in two stages that correspond to two distinct but complementary developments
in the eighteenth century. The first of these was the identification of an object
interesting and important enough to require analysis over and above that already
provided within the framework of the philosophy of natural law. Social and
economic organisation thus came to be viewed as parts of the natural order. The
second development was a recognition of the need for some form of scientific
method in terms of which the analysis would be conducted. Here, according
to Cardoso, political economy was deeply influenced by the growing stature
of sciences that aimed to uncover the laws that governed the functioning of
the natural world. Natural history, the most authoritative field of knowledge in
the eighteenth century, along with the conceptual constructions of the natural
sciences, accordingly came to provide the tools with which political economy
was able to establish itself as a science.
The three chapters that follow, by Alain Marciano, Shaun Hargreaves Heap and
Bruno Frey and Mathias Benz respectively, discuss the virtues and limitations
of the mainstream (neoclassical) economic model of the human agent, and the
potential fruitfulness of a more refined representation. The objective is not, as
Hargeaves Heap makes clear, to suggest that people never act in accordance
with the assumptions of mainstream rational choice theory. Rather, it is to
show that the highly stripped down psychology of the standard model of the
economic agent is too thin to give an adequate account of people’s actions in
all possible walks of life. As Frey and Benz explain, this model is a relatively
recent consequence of economists’ efforts to rid the discipline of all traces of
psychology, a contention well supported by Marciano’s demonstration that
the conception of economic man adopted by the founding fathers of political
economy was indeed considerably richer than it is now. As Marciano describes
it, the rejection of Cartesian rationalism in favour of empiricism by Scottish
Enlightenment authors such as Hume and Smith, led naturally to a theory of
man limited in his cognitive abilities, whose knowledge would always be highly
subjective and situation-dependent.
The central message in Hargreaves Heap’s chapter on ‘Economic rationality’
is the need to pay attention to intersubjectively shared beliefs, particularly
when attempting to understand behaviour that seems resistant to the standard
model of economic agency. In many situations, according to Hargreaves Heap,
individual agents are not driven solely by instrumental reason and the direct
satisfaction they might derive from the outcome of any action, but also by the
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upon them. The difficulty this raises is that even if the desire for self-respect
is regarded as a kind of preference, self-respect does not fit into the analytical
framework of the standard rational choice model. This is because people’s
judgements regarding what actions reflect well on them cannot be decided in
isolation, namely without reference to the beliefs and values of other members
of the community. And if so, it then it becomes necessary to analyse how
individuals acquire and share beliefs about what is worthy. Obviously, these
questions go beyond the boundaries of the rational choice model, and require
input from other disciplines. Hargreaves Heap points out that psychology offers
some relevant insights here, especially about cognitive dissonance and intrinsic/
extrinsic motivation.
Frey and Benz, in their essay ‘From Imperialism to Inspiration: A Survey of
Economics and Psychology’, also argue that economists can no longer rely only
on an approach to human behaviour based on the model of the ‘homunculus
economicus’. They too observe that there are many forms of human behaviour
that are in conflict with the assumptions of, and therefore incomprehensible
within, the framework of the standard model. In particular, Frey and Benz point
out that, in contrast to the standard model, people face cognitive limits and are
emotionally constrained, are not systematically egoistic in their behaviour, and
are not committed to acting under the constraints of the material elements of
their material utility function. The suggested remedy is that economists might
draw on psychology to ‘inspire’ them out of the current impasse. But again,
Frey and Benz are not proposing that economics be replaced by psychology.
They continue to regard the standard model of the rational economic agent as a
consistent general framework against which the insights of psychology, which
‘consists of a large number of partial theories and special effects, which are
more or less isolated from each other’, may be thrown into sharper relief.
A more refined, ‘inspired’ conception of economic man necessarily leads
to normative implications in relation to the nature, the scope and the role of
institutions. For example, in his essay entitled ‘The historical and philosophical
foundations of new political economy’, Marciano shows that sympathy is a
necessary condition for successful co-ordination, although not sufficient to
order large and open societies. Therefore, even if spontaneously emerging
conventions play an important role in allowing successful coordination, there
is also a place for consciously designed institutions in overcoming the natural
limits of sympathy. Hargreaves Heap, for his part, stresses the necessity of
deriving prescriptive consequences from the expressive conception of rationality
he proposes. In particular, from his perspective, it is important to take seriously
the role institutions play in shaping, and contributing to the sharing of beliefs.
Societies need institutions that allow people to participate in the discussion of
shared beliefs, and which give them scope to express those beliefs in action, in
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Geoffrey Hodgson’s chapter, ‘Institutional Economics: From Menger and
Veblen to Coase and North’, surveys the commonalities and differences between
the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ institutionalist schools, as well as some differences
between individual members of each camp. Like many of his co-contributors,
Hodgson is interested in competing theoretical conceptions of the economic actor.
On this front, in his view, the new institutionalism represents a step backwards
in that its commitment to the standard model of rational agency has obscured
various key insights of the older institutionalists. But Hodgson’s main concern
is with the related idea that individual action and institutions bear on each other
in a reciprocal way, i.e., that while individual action presupposes institutions
(or rules), institutions are at the same time affected, indeed reproduced, by
the total of individual action. Hodgson argues that this mutual dependence is
recognised in the writings of the old institutionalist school, which is therefore not
restricted to the doctrine that all human behaviour is socially or institutionally
determined. For example, he demonstrates that both Veblen and Commons see
the interactions between individuals and institutions as a top-down and a bottomup process of reciprocal influences. But Hodgson recognises that the different
ways in which institutions affect peoples’ behaviour remain underdeveloped in
the old institutional economics, and suggests that this issue therefore provides
fertile ground for further work.
As Hodgson notes, one way to proceed here is to adopt an evolutionary
approach to the study of institutions. Veblen’s attempt to harness some of
Darwin’s ideas as a basis for an evolutionary economic science provides
an early example here, and there is of course something of a tradition in
economics of authors advocating evolutionary approaches of various kinds.
Jack Vromen’s chapter, ‘Taking evolution seriously: what difference does it
make for economics?’ is essentially a survey of this tradition, and provides the
valuable service of providing a coherent overview of what is by any measure a
pretty disparate literature. Vromen’s organising principle is the extent to which
the introduction of evolutionary thinking is seen to affect standard methods, and
he provides a revealing grouping of various commentators under the following
three headings: the ‘revolutionaries’, like Veblen, who believe that taking
evolution seriously requires profound changes to standard economic theory;
the ‘conservatives’, like Alchian, Friedman and Becker, who believe it possible
to accommodate evolutionary economic processes within standard economic
theory; and ‘revisionists’ like Robert Frank, who claim that evolutionary themes
can be accommodated by revising or amending parts of standard economic
theory while leaving its essential elements unchanged.
We have noted Hargreaves Heap’s emphasis on specifically rational, private
deliberation in the process of individual preference formation, but other writers
have focused instead on public deliberation. Indeed economists, political
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that deliberation could or should play in our societies, have in some instances
even gone so far as to propose public deliberation as a means of producing
a definition of social justice. However, while it may be convenient to allow
normative economics and political philosophy to be guided by the standards
of public deliberation, this falls well short of what is required for a serious
investigation of the foundations of ethical principles. Indeed, as Marc Fleurbaey
notes in his essay ‘Normative economics and theories of distributive justice’,
too often ordinary thinking about moral principles is guided by pragmatic
considerations and unexamined moral intuitions, when what is needed is that
precise criteria be developed and analysed to produce theories that are complex
enough to address the normative problems society encounters. As a step towards
this end, Fleurbaey provides a careful survey of the various approaches to
the problem of defining social justice that have been developed by economic
theorists and philosophers over the last fifty years. From the Pareto criterion
and its limits to the theories of fairness and equality of resources, and including
discussion of libertarian views and social contract theories, Fleurbaey provides
a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the normative economics literature
that has assumed increasing importance in economic analysis.
The final chapter in this part of the Companion, Alain Leroux’s ‘Ideology:
an economic point of view’, returns to the themes explored in Cardoso’s
opening essay regarding the possibility of separating science from ideology.
Leroux begins with the standard interpretation of ideology offered by Karl
Marx. According to Marx, ideology is an inferior form of discourse that offers
a distorted and coerced representation of the social order – as distinct from
science, the domain of an objective, non-distorted and unconstrained knowledge.
Leroux explains how Marx’s approach leads to a vicious circle, namely that it
is impossible to maintain that any discourse is not spoiled by ideological bias
while at the same time maintaining the possibility of developing an alternative
discourse free from any ideology. This logical trap is known as the Mannheim
Paradox and Joseph A. Schumpeter is one of its most famous victims. In the
face of the impossibility of eliminating ideology from economic discourse,
Leroux proposes instead to put ideology, science, and even philosophy on the
same footing. He does so by presenting them as cognitive strategies or pure
forms of thought that are interdependent and simultaneously active. From this
perspective, science, philosophy and ideology allow us to identify the major
form of thought that characterises a discourse, rather than the objective quality
of the knowledge that is produced.
The methodology and epistemology of economics
The chapters in the second section of this Companion tackle various issues
that have been extensively discussed by methodologists and philosophers of
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Indeed the field of economic methodology as a separate field basically dates
from this period, since practising economists addressed philosophical and
methodological issues in economics prior to Kuhn’s book but mostly left the
field to specialists thereafter. One consequence of this development was an
increasingly sharp division between economists and methodologists regarding
epistemological matters in economics. While economists remained attached to
traditional logical positivist methods and the empirical verification of theories,
economic methodologists almost universally rejected them. At the same time,
by the 1980s there were a number of quite different, competing approaches
pursued by economic methodologists. For a brief time, Karl Popper and Imre
Lakatos’s views held centre stage, but since then economic methodology has
developed multiple currents. The chapters in Part II are accordingly meant
to introduce some of the ideas and themes that have preoccupied economic
methodologists in recent decades.
The first chapter addresses Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research
programmes (MSRP), which in important respects was a development and
reformulation of Popper’s thinking, and was the last approach enjoying a degree
of consensus among methodologists. Roger Backhouse charts the rise and fall
of the MSRP, explaining its appeal and subsequent doubts. The reason for
the latter was less second thoughts regarding the fruitfulness of the MSRP
approach and more a growing interest in a whole variety of new ways of looking
at methodological questions in economics: rhetoric and discourse analysis,
sociology of scientific knowledge, the re-discovery of J.S. Mill, etc. In effect,
methodological thinking was becoming increasingly sophisticated, and this
introduced new subtleties into debate among methodologists. The MSRP,
which offered a broad, comprehensive view of the growth and development
of research programmes began to be perceived as ‘thin’, because it ignored
many issues that had previously been perceived as peripheral. Backhouse’s own
discussion reflects this, as he goes beyond the question that long preoccupied
methodologists in connection with the MSRP – whether it offered an adequate
account of how economists adopted and abandoned research programmes
– to examine Lakatos’s own history before his arrival in Britain, and how this
contributed to the development of his thinking.
Backhouse’s discussion leads naturally to the second chapter in Part II, Wade
Hands’ ‘Constructivism: the social construction of scientific knowledge’, on
the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). Whereas the type of question
methodologists and philosophers had once asked concerned the nature of
scientific knowledge, social constructivists rather asked how scientists came
to hold their theories and beliefs. That is, SSK investigated the determination of
scientists’ beliefs. This focus led to many new ideas (for example, pragmatism,
hermeneutics, postmodernism, and feminism) that significantly expanded the
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also raised difficult philosophical issues, such as what was meant by saying a
theory was true when social factors could be shown to have led to its adoption.
Hands surveys the debates within SSK, and then looks at their application to,
first, economic methodology and, second, the history of economic thought.
The former involves a reflexive exercise in which methodologists ask how
their own beliefs are determined. The latter concerns how economists’ beliefs
are determined. Here we ask need to ask ourselves about social factors that
influence the adoption of beliefs by economists.
One such factor, until recently much under-appreciated, is gender. Historically
economists have generally ignored gender in their explanations of markets
and individual decision-making. How, then, might economics be different
were this particular factor given attention? Drucilla Barker’s chapter in this
section, ‘From feminist empiricism to feminist poststructuralism: philosophical
questions in feminist economics’, surveys the evolution in thinking on the part
of feminist philosophers, methodologists, and economists since the 1980s, in
the process distinguishing feminist empiricism, feminist standpoint theory,
feminist poststructuralism, and feminist postmodernism. She explains how this
development has raised fundamental epistemological and other philosophical
issues, and how these issues have generated debates over objectivity of science,
the tension between facts and values, and the relation between science and
advocacy. Barker emphasises a key perspective on this discussion in her
emphasis on epistemological communities, the feminist one in particular.
Feminist economics is a relatively late arrival in professional economics, and
this had led its proponents to work more closely together to ensure its progress,
reinforcing its character as a community. Like Hands in his treatment of SSK,
then, Barker also makes economic methodology reflexive: or something that
applies to those who develop it as well as to practising economists.
Rob Garnett provides the next contribution to this general discussion in his
‘Rhetoric and postmodernism in economics’. Another of the important pathways
away from methodologists’ early Popper–Lakatos focus concerns the role of
discourse, language, and rhetoric in economic explanation and argument.
Deirdre McCloskey’s work originated much of this literature, and she made a
case for rhetoric as the method of economics by directly contesting traditional
economic methodology – logical positivism, behaviourism, operationalism,
and the hypothetico-deductive model of explanation – as all part of a modernist
intellectual culture. In contrast, a postmodernist economic methodology rejects
foundationalist epistemologies and the search for Truth with a capital-T. Like
SSK and feminist economic methodology, postmodernism examines how
scientific communities operate. One significant theme that arises in this regard is
the extent of pluralism in economics. McCloskey thus not only rejects modernist
economic methodology, but also illiberal and authoritarian practices on the
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her view, ought rather to be modelled on the idea of an open conversation that
is inclusive rather than exclusive in nature.
The remaining chapters in Part II address particular problems and issues
in economic methodology that cut across the recent development of the field.
Jointly they provide a sample of the diversity in themes that have come to reflect
the rapid expansion of methodological thinking in the last two decades. They
also point us towards the first and third parts of this Companion, since they
have also been of interest to philosophers of economics investigating political
economy as political philosophy and the ontology of economics.
Marcel Boumans, in ‘Models in economics’, addresses the practice of
economics in the development of modelling. Traditionally the poles of economic
practice have been thought of as theory and empirical analysis. But economists
generally reason in terms of models, which lie intermediate between theory
and empirical analysis. What does economic methodology then have to tell
us about models in economics? Because models simplify what they represent
they are necessarily unrealistic. This has led some philosophers of science to
argue that models are not representations of the world, but rather instruments
of investigation used to interact with the world (Morgan and Morrison 1999).
To bring out these issues, Boumans traces the evolution in methodological
thinking about models and modelling from arguments developed in physics to
the early thinking about the nature of macro-econometric models on the part of
Jan Tinbergen for the League of Nations. This history is then linked to current
debates in philosophy of science and a discussion of model-building practices in
economics. A surprising result is the variety of different types of elements that
go into models. Models emerge out of a process analogous to baking: separate
ingredients are blended and ultimately combined into the final product.
A related topic is the role and nature of mathematics in economics. Peter
Kesting and Arnis Vilks examine this in their chapter ‘Formalism’. One obstacle
to understanding formalism in economics is the many ways in which the term
is used. Kesting and Vilks consequently begin by explaining formalism broadly
as any approach to theorising that aims at making explicit the logical structure
of a theory, and then distinguish formal systems from set-theoretic formalism.
One of the remarkable developments in economics in the last half century is
general acceptance of set-theoretic formalism. While it is true that most of
present-day mathematics is derived from set theory, this does not imply that
this is the only or even necessarily the best basis for connecting formal models
and reality. The set-theoretic approach owes much of its influence to Bourbakiinfluenced Gerard Debreu’s axiomatic account Theory of Value (1959). But as
many commentators have noted, the rigor of formal models often comes with a
relatively loose interpretation of those same models. Kesting and Vilks pursue
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economics, noting how parables, tacit knowledge, and ‘as if’ assumptions play
a role in the justification of accepted formalist strategies.
The final chapter in this section, Harold Kincaid’s ‘Methodological
individualism and economics’, turns us to a perennial issue in the methodology
of economics: the extent to which explanations can and ought to be cast in
terms of the behavior of individuals. For some, economics is identified with
individualism. But close examination of the underlying claims making such
explanations raise a number of difficult philosophical issues. One of the most
challenging concerns the requirements for reducing statements about social
phenomena to statements about individuals. In the philosophy of science
reductionist arguments have been examined in connection with the question
of whether all science is ultimately physics. Another fundamental issue
involves what constitutes the ‘best’ explanation in science or in economics.
These more philosophical questions return us to economic methodology’s
epistemological concerns, but no less important are the ontological ones the
topic of individualism raises. When we privilege individualist explanations in
economics, do we believe that only individuals exist? That society itself does
not exist? Kincaid argues that many of these questions cannot be solved in an
a priori manner apart from attention to concrete empirical inquiry. But few
economists, he notes, are prepared to accept this conclusion.
Social ontology and the ontology of economics
The chapters in the third and final part of this Companion concentrate on
questions of ontology, that is, questions regarding existence or being and, in
particular, the nature and structure of the socio-economic realm.1 Some of the
authors represented here analyse particular aspects of the social world in a
direct fashion, addressing things such as the relationship between agency and
structure, the nature of probability, and the nature of money. Others take a more
indirect route, starting off with particular theories or modelling tools adopted
by economists, and then asking what these theories or tools presuppose about
the nature and structure of the social world that they are applied to.
The first three chapters are contributions to critical realism, an important
stream in the literature on ontological issues in economics that has been
developing over the last fifteen years or so (see Fleetwood 1999, Lawson 1997,
2003). One of the hallmarks of critical realism is a view of the social world as
structured and open,2 and the broad strategy employed in much of this literature
is to use this view of the world as a benchmark against which to assess the
extent to which different methods are likely to bear fruit in social research. This
strategy is both described and put to work in the first chapter in Part III, Tony
Lawson’s ‘philosophical underlabouring’. Following Locke, Lawson argues that
the appropriate role of the philosopher of science is not to do science or even
John
B. Davis,
Alain Marciano
and
Jochen Runde -rules
9781840649642
to
attempt
to provide
general
methodological
for scientists to follow, but
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/14/2014 11:11:59AM
via free access

Introduction

xxi

rather to engage in what he calls ‘ground clearing’ or removing the ‘rubbish that
lies in the way to knowledge’ in any particular discipline. Lawson identifies
three broad ways in which philosophical ground clearing might be useful, in
what he calls its demystifying, informing and method-facilitating functions.
In Lawson’s view, academic economics is currently in particularly urgent
need of ground clearing, and that the rubbish to be removed is the dogma that
the only legitimate mode of economics analysis is mathematical and/or statistical
modelling. The starting point of his argument is the observation that any specific
set of research practices and procedures presuppose particular (usually implicit)
conceptions of the nature and structure of reality. This is where ontology comes
in, according to Lawson, and why it is so important. He then goes on to argue
that the mathematical and statistical tools of mainstream economics presuppose
a world that ‘everywhere comprises (closed) systems of isolated atoms’, in sharp
contrast to the image of the structured and open social world associated with
critical realism (and which he subsequently goes on to outline). The implication
is that, if the social world is indeed as described in critical realism, then there
is a fundamental mismatch between the tools of mainstream economics and
the social material that those tools are applied to. But Lawson’s arguments here
are not only destructive in intent. He also demonstrates different ways in which
his preferred social ontology may aid social research, by way of providing a
categorical grammar that may help to sharpen substantive social theoretical
conceptions and distinctions, by suggesting a distinctive theory of rationality
that is rather different from the model standardly employed in economics, as
well as by providing directionality to research in various ways.
The two chapters that follow, by Steve Pratten and Paul Lewis respectively,
provide good illustrations of different ways in which some of the lessons of
critical realism may be put to work. Pratten’s chapter is devoted to the New
Institutional Economics, focusing particularly on the transactions costs approach
associated with the work of Oliver Williamson (1985, 1989, 1991). Pratten’s
point of departure is the often-noted ‘gap’ between modern economic theory
and the socio-economic reality that it purports to be about. Like Lawson, Pratten
attributes this gap to the profession’s a priori commitment to mathematical
modelling and the preoccupation with the analysis of fictitious model ‘worlds’
that this commitment seems invariably to entail. Indeed, as Pratten sees it, the
need that many economists feel to conduct research that bears the mathematical
imprimatur of ‘serious’ economic analysis is fundamentally at odds with moving
toward a more realistic and relevant economics. The thing that particularly
interests Pratten about the New Institutional Economics is that this is an area in
which he sees this tension as being especially apparent. For despite criticising
mainstream economics for being unrealistic and promoting their project as one
aimed at greater realisticness and relevance, proponents of the New Institutional
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it is possible to maintain that this tension is an illusion on the grounds that that
the particular formalisms employed so far simply haven’t been the right ones.
However, and drawing on the ontological insights of critical realism, Pratten
argues that so long as the assumptions underpinning mathematical methods
conflict with the constitution of social reality, the mismatch between method
and material will persist and the various resulting tensions and compromises
that he identifies will remain.
Paul Lewis tackles the relationship between human agency and social structure,
a perennial theme in social theory, by way of comparing how this relationship is
dealt with in contemporary Austrian economics on the one hand and in critical
realism on the other. In recent years, members of the radical subjectivist wing
of the Austrian school rejected the atomistic conception of the economic actor
and have emphasised instead the virtues of portraying people as social beings
embedded within networks of shared meanings and interpretive traditions (e.g.
Boettke 1990, 1998; Boettke and Storr 2002; Prychitko 1994a; Vaughn, 1994).
On this view, as Lewis puts it, traditions and people are mutually constitutive,
‘with the former being both an ever-present condition for the possibility of socioeconomic activity and also a continually reproduced outcome of the latter’ and
that the social sciences deal ‘with a pre-interpreted world, where the creation
and reproduction of meaning-frames is an (ontological) condition of that which
it seeks to analyse, namely human conduct’. These phrases are reminiscent of
the so-called transformational model of social activity associated with critical
realism, according to which agency and structure presuppose each other, and
the hermeneutic moment. Lewis points out various points of overlap with the
Austrian position. But there remain significant differences between the two, and
Lewis emphasises in particular that the Austrian view of the ‘socio-economic
world as an intersubjective fabric spun from shared meanings that persist or
change as people negotiate interpretations of events and states of affairs, the
radical subjectivists run the risk of failing to do justice to the importance of
the non-discursive (material) aspects of social structure – vested interested and
power distributions’.
The subject of intersubjectivism leads on neatly to the next two chapters
by John Davis and Edward Fullbrook who tackle the theme of collective or
shared intentionality. Davis proposes ‘collective intentionality analysis’ as a
prospective theoretical framework suited to addressing what he calls ‘complex’
economic behaviour. By complex behaviour Davis means behaviour that is not
amenable to a single explanatory framework such as the mainstream model of
instrumental economic rationality. Collective intentionality analysis involves
a distinct approach to rationality in the form of a deontological or principlebased type rationality that is appropriate to explaining individual interaction
in social groups. If we suppose individuals are both members of social groups
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to be explained in terms of both sorts of rationality principles, giving rise to its
characterisation as complex.
The rationale for employing collective intentionality analysis as an additional
account of economic behaviour is that economic agents appear to behave
differently in organisational, group, and institutional contexts. For example, it is
often noted that trust relationships based on shared intentions emerge in markets
characterised by repeated exchange, whereas spot markets with little repeated
contact tend to be characterised by instrumentally rational behaviour. Here, the
relevant model involves instrumental and collective rationality operating ‘sideby-side’ in proportion to the extent that individuals act socially or in a more
autonomous manner. Further, social groups and organisations differ according
to how they delegate independent action to individuals. When individuals have
considerable autonomy and discretion, this may be due to shared intentions
having created a platform for a circumscribed instrumentally rational behaviour.
That is, instrumentally rational behaviour is embedded in collectively intentional
behaviour. An opposite sort of case involves deceit, deception, and fraud.
Individuals may claim to share intentions while yet acting in a self-serving
manner. Davis points, then, that the possibility that economic behaviour may
be complex implies that the policy value space may itself be complex. Moving
from an exclusive reliance on the instrumental model of economic rationality
also entails moving from an exclusive reliance on efficiency criteria in normative
economics towards complex accounts of valuation and recommendation which
combine efficiency as a value with such values as justice and fairness.
The theme of collective intentionality is continued in the chapter by Edward
Fullbrook, a prominent proponent of intersubjectivism in economic analysis
(Fullbrook 1996, 1997). The guiding idea on the intersubjectivist approach is that
human consciousnesses are constitutionally interdependent, that human subjects
form and reform themselves, not in isolation, but rather in relation to and under
the influence of other human subjects and institutions. As Fullbrook points out,
given how commonsensical this idea is, it is an interesting question why it had
so little impact on modern philosophy until the last century, and, until recently,
in mediating in social theory between holistic and radically individualistic
explanations. Even more significantly, from the viewpoint of this collection, it
is an interesting question why intersubjectivism continues to remain banished
from mainstream economics. Fullbrook attempts to answer these questions
by drawing on the histories of modern philosophy and social theory and their
relations to economics. The first two-thirds of his chapter explore the Cartesian
philosophy from which the atomistic conception of the standard model of the
economic actor derives, and the development of intersubjective philosophy
and social theory over the last century. The final section considers the case
of economics. Here Fullbrook argues that, in turning its back on all economic
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neglected awkward but central empirical realities but also became wedded to a
spurious naturalism and the unarticulated but culturally powerful line of racism
and sexism that this entails.
Philip Faulkner and Jochen Runde devote their chapter to how the standard
model of the economic actor employed in mainstream microeconomics has
limited the way in which it approaches information, knowledge and the related
issues of ignorance and uncertainty. The first half of the chapter is devoted to
an overview of kind of assumptions typically made in respect of economic
actors’ knowledge in mainstream economic models. This is achieved by way
of a detailed exposition of a representative mainstream model, in this case a
simple one-shot Cournot duopoly game under conditions of both complete and
incomplete information. It is shown that even where the model is extended to
the case of incomplete information, a move intended explicitly to highlight
the effects of imperfections and asymmetries in actors’ knowledge, the
degree to which the complexities of human knowledge are reflected remains
severely limited.
The second half of the chapter is devoted to three aspects of human agency that
are neglected by the mainstream approach: non-probabilistic forms of uncertainty
and ignorance, the subjectivity of knowledge, and tacit knowledge. Faulkner
and Runde conclude that the much vaunted information theoretic revolution in
economics (Stiglitz 2000) represents only a first step towards incorporating the
effects of factors such as uncertainty, ignorance and subjectivity into economics.
For instance, by virtue of the commitment to expected utility models of decisionmaking, the actors within mainstream microeconomic models inevitably suffer
only certain forms of uncertainty. There is no scope in these models for actors
to be affected by ignorance of the full set of possible eventualities that might
result from their actions (or indeed the options open to them), or to alter their
behaviour as a result of being unable to state precise probabilities. Categories
such as surprise and novelty, which are closely associated with uncertainty and
ignorance, consequently remain outside the scope of mainstream economics.
The theme of uncertainty and ignorance is also taken up in the chapter by
Chuck McCann, who surveys the major competing interpretations of probability
and how these have emerged in and coloured different parts of economic theory
(note that McCann’s focus is on knowledge and belief, and the way in which
probability theorists have attempted to model them, rather than on probability
as it is employed in statistics and econometrics). After two brief preliminary
sections on knowledge and belief and the axiomatic structure of probability,
McCann introduces the key ontological distinction on which his presentation
turns, between aleatory conceptions of probability on the one hand and epistemic
conceptions on the other. On the aleatory conception, probability is taken to be a
property or feature of the external world (e.g. the frequency of a particular kind
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conception, in contrast, probability is taken to be a feature of how we think about
the world (e.g. your subjective degree of belief in there being rain tomorrow).
This distinction is then deployed as organising principle in McCann’s review
of the major interpretations of probability – classical, frequentist, logical and
personalist – as well as forming the basis for his subsequent elucidation of the
distinction between risk and uncertainty. McCann closes by touching briefly on
some areas in economics in which probability and uncertainty have come to the
fore: (post)Keynesianism, Rational Expectations and Austrianism.
The final chapter in this collection is Geoff Ingham’s wide-ranging study of
various views on the nature of money that have been propounded in different
parts of the discipline. The first part of the chapter deals with the commodityexchange theory that has come to dominate mainstream economic theory, and
the associated conception of money as a neutral veil over what is fundamentally
a barter economy. Ingham raises various criticisms of this account, chief of
which is that its emphasis on money as a device to overcome the problem
of a double coincidence of wants in a pure barter economy, has led to a
misunderstanding and neglect of money of account. This then leads to a long
section on heterodox conceptions of money that theorise money as abstract
value and token credit. The central idea here is that money is constituted, not
simply by some commodity that becomes accepted as a medium of exchange,
but by social relations. Among the figures considered are Knapp, Simmel,
Keynes and Weber, and Ingham shows how the kinds of ideas expressed by
these authors emerge in recent debates on endogenous money, the theory of the
‘money circuit’ and modern neochartelism.
Ingham outlines his own position in a closing section on ‘the fundamentals
of a theory of money’, focusing on three questions: what is money?; how is
it produced?; and how does it obtain, retain or lose its value? Here Ingham
sides with the heterodox tradition and its emphasis on money being constituted
by social relations. Some of the key ontological themes developed here are
that money is uniquely specified as a measure of abstract value and a means
of transporting this abstract value, that money cannot be created without
simultaneous creation of debt, indeed that ‘vast dense networks of overlapping
and interconnected bilateral credit–debt relations constitute money’, and that the
abstract idea of money is a prerequisite for the things that represent money (cash,
cheques, credit cards, magnetic traces on a computer disk, and so on) to work
as money. In an unusual and refreshing touch, Ingham makes various telling
points about how these seemingly abstruse and often-dismissed considerations
can illuminate various recent events on monetary history.
Economics and philosophy
What does the future hold for economics and philosophy? On the one hand,
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questions have a surprisingly natural place in economics, since so many issues
fundamental to the latter find clear and immediate expression when re-presented
in philosophical terms. No doubt many find this an unexpected development,
since for many years economics was widely thought to be a relatively separate
science (Hausman 1992). This view, however, has come into question in light
of the influence that formal mathematical methods have had on economics over
the last half century, and so it is not unreasonable to suppose that economics will
be further changed in the future by growing awareness of and sensitivity to its
philosophical dimensions. On the other hand, the way forward for economics
and philosophy is difficult to predict. Whereas the application of mathematics
to economics generally presupposes a pre-existing set of problems in economics
which it is typically hoped may be illuminated by mathematics, combining
philosophy and economics often involves re-considering one’s very starting
points. Thus not only is there always the potential for fundamental redirection of
economics in light of new philosophical entry points, but it is not easy to predict
what sources of philosophical inspiration might be important to economists in
the future.
However, one possible guide to the future role of philosophy in economics
might be found in the broad philosophical issues afoot in society today regarding
such fundamental issues as the relation between society and nature, the effects
of technological change, the place of moral values in the world, the future of
humanity, and so on. For many years, academic economics has held little interest
for most people. But the now wider place of economics in higher level education
and the greater influence economics seems to have today on people’s everyday
lives appears to have changed this, such that it is no longer unusual for people
from across society to have both some understanding of economics and opinions
about it. Then, on the assumption that peoples’ different views of the world and
the society they live in depends upon their various philosophical presuppositions,
however well articulated or ill-formed these may be, it might well be the case
that these deep-seated views will re-emerge as issues discussed in the domain
of economics and philosophy. But whatever their origin, philosophical concerns
now appear to be well-embedded in economics, and not likely to drift off into
the background again where they once resided.
Notes
1. Recent years have seen a growing interest in ontological issues in economics (see for example
Mäki 1998, 2000, 2001; Lawson 1997, 2003).
2. By the world being structured we mean that it comprises not only events and states of affairs
(the actual) and our experiences of them, but also of an ‘underlying’ and often unobservable
reality of capacities, powers, structures and mechanisms that, once triggered or being otherwise
in play, give rise to and govern those events and states of affairs. By the world being open we
mean that the actual could always have been other than it was.
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